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Abstract. Erroneous behaviour in safety critical real-time systems may
inflict serious consequences. In this paper, we show how to synthesize
timed shields from timed safety properties given as timed automata. A
timed shield enforces the safety of a running system while interfering with
the system as little as possible. We present timed post-shields and timed
pre-shields. A timed pre-shield is placed before the system and provides
a set of safe outputs. This set restricts the choices of the system. A timed
post-shield is implemented after the system. It monitors the system and
corrects the system’s output only if necessary. We further extend the
timed post-shield construction to provide a guarantee on the recovery
phase, i.e., the time between a specification violation and the point at
which full control can be handed back to the system. In our experimental
results, we use timed post-shields to ensure the safety in a reinforcement
learning setting for controlling a platoon of cars, during the learning and
execution phase, and study the effect.
1 Introduction
Today’s systems are becoming increasingly sophisticated and powerful. At the
same time, systems have to perform highly safety critical tasks, e.g., in the do-
main of self-driving cars, and make extensive use of machine learning, such as
reinforcement learning [15]. As a result, complete offline verification is rarely
possible. This holds especially true for safety critical real-time systems, where
a deadline violation comes with serious consequences. An alternative is runtime
verification [3–5, 7]. Runtime enforcement (RE) [13, 19, 27] extends this by en-
forcing the expected behavior of a system at runtime.
In this paper, we focus on the enforcement of regular timed properties for
reactive systems and automatically synthesize timed shields from timed automata
specifications. A timed shield can be attached to a system in two alternative
ways. A timed post-shield (see Fig. 1(a)) is implemented after the system. It
monitors the system and corrects the system’s output if necessary. A timed
pre-shield (see Fig. 1(b)) is placed before the system and provides a list of safe
outputs to the system. This list restricts the choices of the system to safe actions.
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Fig. 1: Types of shielding.
Timed post-shields guarantee the following two properties. (1) Correctness:
the shielded system satisfies the safety specification, and (2) No-Unnecessary-
Deviation: the shield intervenes with the system only if safe system behavior
would be endangered otherwise. We extend timed post-shields to shields that ad-
ditionally provide guarantees on the recovery time, after which control is handed
back to the system; i.e., from that point on the shield forwards the outputs to
the environment and does not deviate anymore. (3a) Guaranteed-Recovery: the
recovery phase ends within a finite time, and (3b) Guaranteed-Time-Bounded-
Recovery: the recovery phase ends after a given bounded time.
Timed pre-shields guarantee the following two properties. (1) Correctness:
the shield provides only safe outputs to the system, and (2) No-Unnecessary-
Restriction: the shield provides all safe outputs to the system.
Shields can be employed during reinforcement learning (RL) to ensure safety
by enforcement both during a system’s learning and execution phases [1,9]. We
introduce a timed post-shield after the learning agent, as depicted in Fig. 2. The
shield monitors the actions selected by the learning agent and corrects them if
and only if the chosen action is unsafe.
To sum up, we make the following contributions:
– We propose to synthesize timed shields from timed automata specifications.
– We discuss two basic types of timed shields: pre-shields and post-shields.
– We propose timed post-shields with the ability to recover.
– Our experiments show the potential of timed shields to enforce safety in RL.
Related Work. In most work about RE, an enforcer monitors a program
that outputs events and can either terminate the program once it detects an
error [24], or alter the event in order to guarantee, for example, safety [16] or
privacy [18,28]. Renard et al. [23] and Falcone et al. [14] considered RE for timed
properties. The similarities between these enforcers and a shield is in their ability
to alter events. Their work only considers static programs whereas we consider
enforcing correctness for reactive systems.
The term runtime assurance [25] is often used if there exist a switching mecha-
nism that alternates between running a high-performance system and a provably
safe one. These concept is similar to post-shielding, with the difference that we
synthesize the entire provable safe system (the shield) including the switching
mechanism while proving guarantees on recovery.
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Fig. 2: A timed post-shield in a reinforcement learning setting.
Knighofer et. al. introduced [19] shield synthesis from LTL specifications,
which, while related, are not expressible enough to capture real time behavior
and thus cannot shield against timing related faults in real timed systems. Wu
et al. [26] extend shields for boolean signals to real-valued shields to enforce
the safety of cyber-physical systems. The concept of shield synthesis for RL
from (probabilistic) LTL specification was discussed in [1,17] and early work on
combining (basic) shielding with RL was demonstrated in [9].
We use the specification theory of Timed In-put/Output Automaton (TIOA)
used by Uppaal Ecdar [11]. To synthesize our timed shields we use Up-
paal Tiga [8], a tool which implements algorithms for solving games based
on timed game automata with respect to reachability and safety properties, pro-
ducing non-deterministic safety strategies. Uppaal Stratego [9, 10] extends
Uppaal Tiga by the capability of optimizing these strategies with respect to
desired performance measures. While Uppaal Stratego contains a RL com-
ponent, we utilize a third-party, off-the-shelf, RL-system to demonstrate the
applicability of the proposed method in a generic RL setting.
Outline. In Sec. 2 we give the formal notation and constructions. Definition
and construction of timed post-shields (with recoverability garuantees under
different fault models) are introduced in Sec. 3 (Sec. 4). Timed pre-shields are
introduced in Sec. 5. We discuss our experimental findings from a car platooning
problem in Sec. 6 followed by a conclusion in Sec. 7.
2 Specification Theory for Real-Time Systems
Let us recall definitions of Timed (Input/Output) Automata. Let X be a finite
set of real-valued clocks. Let V(X) 7→ R≥0 be the valuations over X and let
→
0
be the valuation that assigns 0 to each clock. For the value of a single clock of a
given valuation ν ∈ V(X), we write ν(x) and ν[x] denotes the reset of the clock
x in the valuation ν. We extend the notion of reset to sets, i.e., for some Y ⊆ X
let ν[Y ] be the valuation after resetting all values of clocks in Y to zero and
otherwise retaining their value. If δ ∈ R≥0 is a positive delay, then we denote by
ν + δ the valuation s.t. for all x ∈ X, (ν + δ)(x) = ν(x) + δ.
Let Y ⊆ X and Z ⊆ X ∪ Z. We denote the set of all simple constraints as
Φ(Y ,Z) = Y × {<,≤,≥,>} × Z. The set of all possible clock constraints is
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defined by C(X) = 2Φ(X,X∪Z). We denote the (conjunctive) subset of restricted
clock constraints by B(X) ⊆ C(X) with B(X) = 2Φ(X,Z).
Definition 1 (Timed Input/Output Automaton (TIOA) [2,12]). A Timed
Input/Output Automaton (TIOA) is a tuple A = (L, `0,Σ?,Σ!, X, E , I) where
L is a finite set of locations, `0 is the initial location, Σ = Σ
?∪Σ! is a finite set
of actions partitioned into inputs (Σ?) and outputs (Σ?), X is a set of clocks,
E ⊆ L × B(X) × (Σ! ∪ Σ?) × 2X × L is a set of edges, and I : L → B(X) is a
function assigning invariants to locations.
States of a TIOA are given as a pair (`, ν) ∈ L × RX≥0 consisting of a discrete
location and a real-valued assignment to the clocks. From a given state (`, ν) ∈
L×RX≥0 where ν |= I(`), we have two kinds of transitions; (1) discrete transitions:
(`, ν)
α−→ (`′, ν′) if there exists (`,ψ,α,Y , `′) ∈ E s.t. ν |= ψ, ν′ = ν[Y ] and
ν′ |= I(`′), and (2) delay transitions for some δ ∈ R≥0 where (`, ν) δ−→ (`, ν′) if
ν′ = ν + δ and ν′ |= I(`). We define the semantics of a TIOA as a TLTS.
Definition 2 (Timed Labeled Transitions System (TLTS) [2, 12]). A
TLTS is a tuple JAK = (Q, q0,→) s.t. Q = L × RX≥0 , q0 = (`0,→0 ), and →:
Q×Σ! ∪Σ? ∪ R≥0 ×Q is a transition relation defined as above.
A trace σ of an TIOA is a finite sequence of alternating delay and discrete
transitions of the form (l0, v0)
δ1−→ (l0, v0+δ1) τ1−→ (l1, v1) δ2−→ · · · δn−→ (ln−1, vn−1+
δn)
τn−→ (ln, vn), where v0 =
→
0 and τi = (li−1,αi, gi,Y , li) ∈ E . By agreement
we let
∗−→ denote the transitive closure of the transition-function.
The state space of TIOA can be represented via zones [2], symbolic sets of
states containing the max. set of clock valuations satisfying given constraints.
In this paper, we only consider deterministic and input enabled TIOA. A
is deterministic, if JAK satisfies that ∀α ∈ Σ,∀(`, ν) ∈ Q.(`, ν) α−→ (`′, ν′) ∧
(`, ν)
α−→ (`′′, ν′′) =⇒ `′ = `′′ ∧ ν′ = ν′′. Thus, in every state, transitions of a
given label will lead to a unique state. A is input-enabled, if JAK satisfies that
∀α ∈ Σ?,∀(`, ν) ∈ Q.(`, ν) α−→ (`′, ν′). Thus, every state can receive any input.
For simplicity, we assume implicit input-enabledness in our figures.
TIOA can be used as specifications. Specifications are not necessarily exact on
timing behaviour (e.g., on the output of a label) but allow for ranges of timing.
An implementation satisfies a specification as long as any behavior is included
in that of the specification.
Example. Fig. 3(a) shows a specification Spec1 of a light switch: whenever
the light is switched ON, this setting has to be kept for 1 to 5 time units. Whenever
the light is switched OFF, the light switch has to blink at least once every 3 time
units. The timing is tracked via the clock x.
We say that a TIOA AI refines a TIOA AS if the corresponding TLTS JAIK
refines the TLTS JASK, let us formally defined this relationship.
Definition 3 (Refinement [12]). A TLTS I = (QI , qI0 ,→I) refines a TLTS
S = (QS , qS0 ,→S), written I ≤ S, iff there exists a binary relation R ⊆ QI×QS
containing (qI0 , q
S
0 ) such that for each pair of states (qI , qS) ∈ R we have:
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Fig. 3: Specification Spec1 (a) of a light switch; specification Spec2 refines it (b).
Fig. 4: A monitor mSpec of the light switch specification Spec1 of Fig. 3(a).
1. if ∃q′S ∈ QS . qS i?−→S q′S then ∃q′I ∈ QI . qI i?−→I q′I and (q′I , q′S) ∈ R
2. if ∃q′I ∈ QI .qI o!−→I q′I then ∃q′S ∈ QS .qS o!−→S q′S and (q′I , q′S) ∈ R and
3. if ∃δ ∈ R≥0.qI δ−→I q′I then qS δ−→S q′S and (q′I , q′S) ∈ R.
Example. Fig. 3(b) shows a specification Spec2 that refines the specification
Spec1 of Fig 3(a) by restricting the timings of some of the signals.
Given a specification Spec and a system Sys, a monitor mSpec observes Sys
w.r.t Spec (i.e., all transitions in mSpec are inputs) and enters an error-state ERR
whenever non-conformance between Sys and Spec is observed, that is, whenever
an output of Sys is observed that is not allowed by Spec.
Example. Fig. 4 depicts a monitor for Spec1 of Fig. 3(a).
We use Networks of Timed Automata to enable parallel composition of TIOA.
Definition 4 (Networks of Timed Automata (NTA) [2]). Let Σ be a
set of actions and let Σ1, . . . ,Σn be a partitioning of Σ. Let A1,A2, . . . ,An be
TIOAs, where JAiK = (Qi, qi0,→i) and Ai has Σi as its output and Σ as its
input alphabet. A network of TIOA A1‖A2‖ . . . ‖An is defined via the TLTS
(Q1 × · · · × Qn, (q10 , ..., qn0 ),→) with:
[si
δ−→i s′i]i=1...n
(s1, . . . , sn)
δ−→ (s′1, . . . , s′n)
with δ ∈ R≥0, and
[sj
α!−→j s′j ][si α?−→i s′i]i 6=j
(s1, . . . , sn)
α!−→ (s′1, . . . , s′n)
with α ∈ Σj .
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For deterministic specifications, the following important theorem, given in the
syntax of Uppaal queries [6], holds, stating that a system refines a specification
iff the parallel product of the system and the specification monitor cannot reach
the error-state.
Theorem 1. ∀ Sys. Sys ≤ Spec iff (Sys | mSpec) |= A2 ¬mSpec.ERR
Definition 5 (Timed Game Automaton (TGA) [21]). A Timed Game
Automaton (TGA) is a TIOA in which the set of output actions Σ! is partitioned
into controllable actions (ΣC) and uncontrollable actions (ΣU ).
The definition of NTA trivially extends to Networks of TGA (NTGA).
Given a TGA G = (〈L, `0,Σ, X, E , I, 〉, ΣU ,ΣC), a memoryless strategy ω :
L × RX≥0 ⇀ 2{λ}∪ΣC is a function over the states of G to the set of controllable
actions or a special nothing-symbol τ .
Definition 6 (Strategy Composition). Given a TGA G = (〈L, `0,Σ, X, E , I, 〉,
ΣU ,ΣC) and a memoryless strategy ω, the composition G‖ω provides a restric-
tion of the transition-system of G;
– if (`, ν)
α−→ (`′, ν′) then either we have α ∈ Σ? or we have α ∈ Σ! and
α 6∈ ΣC or α ∈ ω(`, ν), and
– if (`, ν)
δ−→ (`′, ν′) for δ ∈ R≥0 then ∀δ′ < δ it holds that λ ∈ ω(`, ν + δ′).
Let ϕ ⊆ L be a set of losing locations for a TGA G. The safety control
problem consists in finding a strategy ω, s.t. G‖ω constantly avoids ϕ. A trace
σ = (l0, v0)
δ1−→ (l0, v0 + δ1) · · · δn−→ (ln−1, vn−1 + δn) τn−→ (ln, vn) is winning if
∀k ≤ n : lk /∈ ϕ. A strategy ω is winning, if all traces of G‖ω are winning.
We denote by Wr ⊆ L × R≥0 the winning region, i.e., the set of all states s
such that there exists a winning strategy from s. We denote by correct (wrong)
outputs for a state s the outputs that lead to an s′ ∈Wr (s′ 6∈Wr, respectively).
We denote by Swr the set of states in Wr, such that any delay would leave Wr.
3 Timed Post-Shields
This section defines and gives the construction of timed post-shields, illustrated
in Fig. 1(a). A timed post-shield is attached after the system, monitors its inputs
and outputs, corrects the system’s output if necessary and forwards the correct
output to the environment.
3.1 Definition of Timed Post-Shields
In this section, we define a timed post-shield based on its two desired properties:
Definition 7 (Correctness for Post-Shields.). Let Spec be a specification,
and let Sys be a timed system. We say that a shield Sh ensures correctness if and
only if it holds that
(Sys | Sh) ≤ Spec.
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That is, for any (faulty) system Sys, if it is placed in parallel with the shield, the
shielded system is guaranteed to satisfy the specification.
Definition 8 (No-Unnecessary-Deviation.). Let Spec be a specification, let
mSpec be its corresponding monitor, let Sys be a timed system, and let Sh be a
shield. Let σ be any correct timed trace of Sys, i.e., every action in σ is cor-
rect, and no state along σ is in Swr. We say that Sh does not deviate from Sys
unnecessarily, if (Sys|Sh) keeps the output for σ intact.
In other words if Sys does not violate Spec, Sh simply forwards the outputs of Sys
to the environment without altering them. Once we reach a state in Swr, there
is no way to know whether the system would produce an output on time, and
the shield is allowed to deviate.
Definition 9 (Timed Post-Shields.). Given a specification Spec, Sh is a timed
post-shield if for any timed system Sys, it holds that Sh enforces correctness of
the shielded system w.r.t. Spec (Def. 7) and Sh does not deviate from Sys unnec-
essarily (Def. 8).
3.2 Construction of Timed Post-Shields
In this section we discuss the synthesis procedure of timed post-shields without
guarantees on the recovery time.
Algorithm 1. Let Spec be a specification, mSpec a monitor for Spec, and Sys
a timed system. We construct a timed post-shield Sh via the following steps.
Step 1: Construction of the monitor mSpec’. To differentiate the outputs
given by the system and those given by the shield, we prime the outputs of the
shield. The monitor mSpec’ is a copy of mSpec, where all outputs are primed.
mSpec’ is used to ensure that the outputs of the shield are correct.
Step 2: Construction of the automaton Ctr. The automaton Ctr is the
only component that contains controllable transitions and depicts the control op-
tions for the shield, i.e., Ctr produces the primed outputs. Ctr is constructed such
that the no-unnecessary-deviation property is satisfied by the shield. Therefore,
mSpec informs Ctr whether the system’s output is wrong or the current state is
in Swr, i.e., the winning region of mSpec is left. Ctr can perform three types of
actions: (1) pre-fault actions: before an error was detected, Ctr can only mirror
actions produced by Sys; (2) post-fault actions: after an error was detected, Ctr
has full control and can chose any action at a any time; and (3) last-chance
actions: whenever the current state is in Swr and any delay would leave the win-
ning region, the shield can prevent that possibility and can choose any action
that is allowed in the current state of mSpec’.
Example. Fig. 5 depicts the Ctr component for the light switch of Fig. 3(a).
The two edges on the left (marked in blue) are pre-fault actions, that copy the
system behaviour if no fault was detected, i.e., error == 0 (The error variable is
set when Sys produces an output that would leave the winning region.). The two
transitions in the top right corner (green) are post-fault actions: if an error was
7
Fig. 5: An automaton Ctr, defining control options of a shield for the light switch.
detected, i.e., error == 1, they will be enabled, and Ctr can choose any output.
The two transitions in the bottom right (orange) show last-chance actions, for
the case where the specification reached a time bound, in which case Ctr is allowed
to take over, as a fault of the system may be imminent.
Step 3: Construct the timed safety game G. We construct the timed
game G by the following composition:
G = mSpec | mSpec′ | Ctr
In this game the monitor mSpec observes whether the system Sys satisfies the
specification Spec, the monitor mSpec’ observes whether the outputs of the shields
are correct, and Ctr enforces that the shield does not deviate unnecessarily and
is in charge of producing the primed outputs.
Step 4: Compute a strategy ωS of G. Post-shields ensure correctness
(safety), i.e., the control objective is to ensure that Spec’ is never violated by the
shielded system. This can be expressed via the following safety query specifying
that the error state should never be reached, given in Uppaal Tiga syntax.
control : A2 ¬mSpec′.ERR
Solving the safety game w.r.t. this query produces a strategy ωS , which we
use in the next step to produce a timed post-shield.
Step 5: Construction of the timed post-shield ShS. From the strat-
egy ωS , we construct the shield ShS in the following way: A shield ShS is the
network of timed automata received by composing G with the derived strategy
ωS , denoted by G‖ωS , meaning that all unsafe transitions (or transitions that
would not lead to recovery) are restricted. This shield may still permit multiple
outputs in a given state, any of which ensures safety.
Theorem 2. A shield ShS constructed according to Alg. 1 is a timed post-shield.
Proof. We have to proof that ShS satisfies the correctness property and the no-
unnecessary-deviation property. ShS satisfies the correctness property, since all
transitions leaving the winning region were removed from G|ωS . It thus holds
that (Sys | Sh) ≤ Spec′. Thus the primed outputs of the shield satisfy the
8
Fig. 6: A fault model Specfi for a transient fault that captures an unexpected
output that resets a clock.
specification. Additionally, the construction G via the automaton Ctr ensures
that the shield cannot alter an action before a fault occurs, thereby ensuring
that the shield cannot deviate unnecessarily uunionsq
4 Timed Post-Shields with Recovery Guarantees
In this section, we first discuss the challenges that we face when synthesizing
shields with the ability to recover from system faults and discuss assumptions
that we make on the system and its faults that are necessary for our synthesis
procedure. Next, we define and construct timed post-shields with guaranteed
recovery and guaranteed time-bounded recovery.
4.1 Recovery under Fault Models
In shield synthesis, we consider the system to be shielded as a black box, which
brings a huge scalability advantage, especially when shielding complex timed
implementations. Therefore, a shield has to ensure correctness for any system.
In order to end the recovery phase and to hand back control to the system, the
shield needs to resolve the error that occurred, i.e., the state of the shield needs
to align with the actual state of the system. The tricky part is, as mentioned
before, that the system is considered as a black box and the shield can only
observe the system’s outputs but not its internal state.
In this paper we assume that the only violations that happen are due to
transient errors.
Definition 10 (Transient Error). A transient error is an error that happens
only once, and has correct pre-error and post-error behavior.
To determine the state of a system in case of a fault, we launch several fault
models and assume that one of this fault models captures the fault.
Definition 11 (Fault Model). Let Spec be a specification. A fault model Specfi
for Spec consists of two copies of the specification Spec, one copy for the pre-fault
behavior and one copy for the post-fault behavior. The two copies are connected
with a single transient error.
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Example. Fig. 6 gives an example of a fault model. The fault captures the
situation, in which an off signal is produced in the OFF location and this faulty
signal additionally resets the clock xfm, but does not change the location of the
automaton. In the fault model, this transient fault leads from the OFF location
from the pre-fault part to the OFF in the post-fault part.
Since we cannot observe the internal state of the system, we do not know
which fault model captured the fault that occurred. Thus, the shield can only
end the recovery phase if all fault models and the specification align; i.e., if all
Specfi and mSpec reach the same state. To achieve this, in the recovery phase,
we monitor the behavior of the system and update the fault models accordingly.
If a fault model can not follow the output of the system (including not allowing
a delay that is possible in the system), it was not the correct fault model for
the observed fault and is discarded. Only if all active, i.e., non-discarded, fault
models agree on the same state, the shield and the system synchronized again.
Types of transient faults. We consider fault models covering the following
fault types; categorized in location-faults, clock-faults, and their combination.
– Location-faults:
• Go-to-any-location faults: the system goes to an arbitrary location. To
track the its location, we need a fault model for every location in Spec.
• Go-to-next-location faults: the system gives an incorrect output, but con-
tinues in a correct successor location. Thus, the fault models only need
to cover the valid successor locations.
– Clock-faults:
• Wrong-reset faults: the system illegally resets a clock to zero. Such faults
occur, e.g., if the system gives a planned reset at a wrong point in time,
or the systems resets the wrong clock.
• Swapped-clocks faults: the system swaps the values of several selected
clocks. This might be a binary swaps between two clocks, or permutations
between several clocks.
• Missing-reset faults: the system ignores a planned reset of a clock, re-
sulting in a clock value that is too high.
Example. The fault shown in Fig. 6(a) is a wrong-reset fault, i.e., the fault
does not change the location of the model, but only resets the clock xfm.
4.2 Definition of Timed Post-Shields with Recovery Guarantees
We now define shields which satisfy an additional property: guaranteed-recovery
or guaranteed-time-bounded-recovery.
The Guaranteed-Recovery Property. In this paper, we synthesize shields
with guaranteed (time-bounded) recovery under the assumption that the system
satisfies the specification except for a single transient fault and that this fault is
covered by one of the fault models Specfi with i ∈ {1 . . . n}.
Definition 12 (Guaranteed Recovery). Let Spec be a specification, let mSpec
be its monitor, let Specf = {Specf1 . . . Specfn} be a set of fault models, let Sys be
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a timed system with Sys ≤ Specfi for some Specfi ∈ Specf . We say that Sh
guarantees recovery if for every trace σ containing a single transient fault, i.e.,
there exists a point in time t1 such that mSpec reaches the error location ERR at
t1, there exists a time t2 > t1 such that after t2 (Sys|Sh) keeps σ intact.
That is, if the system refines any of our considered fault models, we guarantee
that an observed error will lead to recovery and the system and the shield give
the same output again.
The Guaranteed-Time-Bounded-Recovery Property. This property
guarantees that the recovery phase lasts for at most T time units after a fault.
Definition 13 (Guaranteed Time-Bounded Recovery). Let Spec be a spec-
ification, let mSpec be its monitor, let Specf = {Specf1 . . . Specfn} be a set of fault
models, let Sys be a timed system with Sys ≤ Specfi for some Specfi ∈ Specf . We
say that Sh guarantees recovery within a bound T if for every trace σ contain-
ing a single transient fault, i.e., there exists a point in time t1 such that mSpec
reaches the error location ERR at t1, we have that after time t1 + T , (Sys|Sh)
keeps σ intact.
4.3 Construction of Timed Post-Shields with Recovery Guarantees
In this section we discuss the synthesis procedure of timed timed post-shields
with guaranteed recovery and with guaranteed time-bounded recovery.
Algorithm 2. Let Spec be a specification, mSpec its monitor, and Specf =
{Specf1 . . . Specfn} a set of fault models. Starting from Spec, mSpec, Specf , we con-
struct a timed post-shield with guaranteed-recovery (ShG), or with guaranteed-
time-bounded-recovery (ShGT ) via the following steps.
Steps 1 and 2. Perform as in Section 3.2.
Step 3: Construct the monitors mSpecfi . Transform the fault models
Specfi into monitors mSpecfi for i ∈ {1 . . . n}.
Step 4: Construct the timed Game G. Now we can consider the timed
game given by the following composition:
G = mSpecf1 |...| mSpecfi | mSpec | mSpec′ | Ctr
In this game, we observe conformance of the system with respect to the fault
models mSpecfi and the original specification via mSpec, enforce the correctness
of the shield via mSpec’, and ensure no unnecessary deviations via Ctr. Next, we
compute the winning strategies ωg and ωgt of G such that that the corresponding
shields guarantee recovery and guarantee time-bounded recovery, respectively.
Step 5a: Compute a strategy ωg of G for guaranteed-recovery. For
guaranteed recovery, we need to establish a state where all active fault models
agree with each other and the Spec’, that is, they are all in the same location with
same clock values. This can be achieved with the following leads-to property [6],
specifying that if we observe a fault, this will eventually lead to recovery.
control : A2 ¬mSpec′.ERR ∧mSpec.ERR leadsto
(∀i.[mSpecfi .ERR ∨ (mSpecfi .l == mSpec′.l ∧ mSpecfi .x = mSpec′.x)])
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Solving G w.r.t. this query will produce a strategy ωg. Note, that if a fault
model is inactive, i.e., it reached its error-state, this means that Sys performed
an output that was not valid in the fault model.
Step 5b: Compute a strategy ωgt of G for guaranteed-time-bounded-
recovery. We slightly change the timed leads-to property to compute ωgt for
guaranteed recovery within a time bound T :
control : A2 ¬mSpec′.ERR ∧mSpec.ERR leadsto≤T
(∀i.[mSpecfi .ERR ∨ (mSpecfi .l == mSpec′.l ∧ mSpecfi .x = mSpec′.x)])
Step 6: Construction of the timed post-shields ShG and ShGT . We con-
struct a shield with guaranteed-recovery ShG by G‖ωg, and a shield with guaranteed-
time-bounded-recovery ShGT by G‖ωgt.
Theorem 3. The shields ShG and ShGT , constructed by Alg. 2, are timed post-
shields with guaranteed-recovery and guaranteed-time-bounded-recovery, resp.
Proof. Correctness and no-unnecessary-deviation are given as for regular timed
post-shields. ShG (ShGT ) is a shield with guaranteed-(time-bounded)-recovery,
simply by the query it was produced from, which can only be satisfied if all
traces in ShG (ShGT ) either do not encounter a fault, or the fault will lead to
recovery at some point (within T time units) along the trace. uunionsq
Discussion: timed post-shields. Both types of shields, with and without
recovery, have pros and cons. Obviously, the ability of guaranteed recovery after
a system fault is highly desirable. This is especially true, if the system to be
shielded is highly optimized and performs complex tasks that are not captured
in the specification of the shield. Nevertheless, it may not be feasible to syn-
thesize post-shields with the ability to recover. First, guaranteed recovery is not
always possible and therefore, no shield that guarantees recovery may exist. An
obvious example that demonstrates this fact is a shield for a system that never
resets one of its clocks. If a fault occurred that changes the value of this clock,
synchronization is never possible. Second, to capture any transient fault that is
possible under a given fault category, an exponential number of fault models is
needed. This results in an exponential blowup in the state space and synthesis
time. Therefore, it may not be feasible to synthesize shields with guaranteed
recovery for large specifications considering a large number of fault models.
5 Timed Pre-Shields
In this section we define and construct timed pre-shields. A timed pre-shield is
attached before the system as illustrated in Figure 1(a). At any point in time,
a timed pre-shield provides a set of actions Act for the system to choose from.
This set of action can contain a delay action. If this is the case, the system is
permitted to wait without performing any discrete action. If the set does not
include a delay action, the system has to produce an output immediately. If the
system picks the outputs according to this list, then it is guaranteed that the
shield and the timed system together satisfy the specification.
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Fig. 7: The control options for a timed-pre shield of the light switch.
5.1 Definition of Timed Pre-Shields
In this section we define timed pre-shields based on two properties; correctness
and no unnecessary restriction.
Definition 14 (Correctness for Pre-Shields). Let Spec be a specification,
and let Sh be a pre-shield. For any state s from Sh, let Act = α1, . . . ,αn be the
set of enabled actions sent by Sh. A pre-shield is correct, if it holds that if α is
a wrong action for the given situation, then α 6∈ Act.
Definition 15 (No-Unnecessary-Restriction). Let Spec be a specification,
and let Sh be a pre-shield. For any state s from Sh, let Act = α1, . . . ,αn be the
set of enabled actions sent by Sh. A pre-shield is not unnecessarily restrictive, if
it holds that if α is a correct action for the given situation, then α ∈ Act.
Definition 16 (Timed Pre-Shields.). Given a specification Spec. Sh is a
timed pre-shield if it holds that Sh enforces correctness for any timed system
Sys w.r.t. Spec (Def. 14) and Sh is not unnecessarily restrictive (Def. 15).
5.2 Construction of Timed Pre-Shields
We construct timed pre-shields according to the following algorithm.
Algorithm 3. Starting from Spec, mSpec, we construct a timed pre-shield.
Step 1. Construction of the automaton Ctr. Since there is no concept
of minimal deviation in pre-shields, the control options of the Ctr component
are not restricted. Instead, in this setting, we build Ctr such that it can fire any
output at any time, i.e., it has a single location and unguarded self-loops for
every output. Note that timed pre-shields do not need primed outputs.
Example. The component Ctr for the light switch is depicted in Fig. 7.
Steps 2. Construct the timed safety game G. We construct the timed
game G by the following composition:
G = mSpec | Ctr
Step 3: Compute a strategy ωpre of G. Pre-shields ensure correctness
(safety), i.e., the control objective is to ensure that Spec is never violated. Solving
the safety game w.r.t. the following query produces a strategy ωpre.
control : A2 ¬mSpec.ERR
Step 4: Computing the set of enabled actions via zones. For a given
state, the set of enabled actions Act is computed via zones. From any given state,
its zones can be calculated straightforwardly, see [2].
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Fig. 8: The zones reachable by delay from a state s in a TIOA with two clocks, x
and y. The squares represent constraints for two transitions with label a and b.
Example. The concept of zones is illustrated in Fig. 8, where the X and Y
axis depict different clocks, and the squares represent the constraints in which
different controllable actions a and b are enabled. We have for a : {1 < x <
5, 2 < y < 5} and for b : {4 < x < 8, 3 < y < 6}.
The set of enabled actions is kept up to date by monitoring the current state
of Shpre. Whenever a new input or output from the system is received, the state
is updated. From the new state, we calculate all zones that can be reached via
delay and the actions enabled in each zone. The set of actions Act for the current
zone is sent to the system. In case the end of the zone is not met yet, this includes
a delay action. If enough time passes so that the end of the current zone is met,
the shield needs to check whether future zones permit actions. If so, the set of
actions of the next zone is passed to the system. Otherwise, the current set of
actions is transmitted again, this time without a delay action. The system may
choose any of the permitted actions, including delay if possible.
Example. In Fig. 8, the actions enabled per zone are z1 = {}, z2 = {a}, z3 =
{a,b}, z4 = {b}, z5 = {}. Thus, in the state S which is in z1, Act is empty, after
one time unit Act = {a}, and so on.
Theorem 4. A shield Shpre constructed according to Alg. 3 is a timed pre-shield.
Proof. In order for Shpre to be a timed pre-shield, Shpre needs to satisfy
correctness for pre-shields and the no-unnecessary-restriction property. Shpre is
correct, as the safety game removes every transition leaving the winning region. It
has no-unnecessary-restriction, as Ctr is not restricted when producing outputs,
and all correct actions are kept when producing the strategy. uunionsq
Discussion: Pre-shielding vs. Post-shielding. Post-Shielding has the
advantage, that we treat the system as a total back box. In order for pre-shielding
to work, we need a system that chooses the actions w.r.t. the suggestions of the
shield. Usually, we have this setting in RL where the shield can easily influence
the set of available actions from the agent. Instead of overruling the system, a
pre-shield leaves the choice of which action should be executed always to the
system, i.e., the system can do anything as long as it is safe. Thus, the overall
efficiency of the system is kept as high as possible. It has already been shown that
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Fig. 9: Results training phase.
removing unsafe options during learning can significantly speed up the learning
process [1].
6 Experiments
To validate our approach, we extend the case-study of Larsen et. al. [20] to a
platoon of multiple cars4. In the case study, an RL agent controls n follower
vehicles in the platoon following an (environment controlled) leader vehicle. All
vehicles can drive a maximum of 20m/s and have three different possible accel-
erations modes: −2m/s2, 0m/s2 and 2m/s2 which can be changed at every time
unit. The goal of the RL agent is to control the followers in the platoon such
that the total distance between all vehicles is minimized. Furthermore, the RL
agent receives a negative reward if the distance between two cars is outside a
safe region (≤ 5m) or is too large (above 200m). The hyper-parameters of the
RL setting can be found in Appendix A. We used the models from [20] and syn-
thesized timed post-shields with Uppaal Tiga, as discussed in Sec. 3. We study
the behaviour of RL agents in the context of 1. no shielding, 2. post-shielding
during execution, and 3. post-shielding during both training and execution. We
report the learning curves during the training phase and the performances in
the execution phase for n ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8, 10} where n denotes the number of cars.
Training. Each training episode starts with random but safe initial distances
and velocities of all cars. During the simulation, the environment picks the ac-
celerations of the leading car via a uniform distribution. A training episode lasts
for 2000 time units, or until the distance between two cars gets smaller than 5m
or larger than 200m. Note, that with a shield, a training episode always lasts
2000 time units, since safety is always guaranteed.
Fig. 9 compares the learning curves as a mean of 20 training phases, for the
unshielded case (left) and the shielded case (right). The reward in the unshielded
case is considerably higher than in the shielded setting. We observe that the agent
exploits the relatively low risk of a crash and makes potentially unsafe choices.
Since the accelerations of the leading car are picked via an uniform distribution, it
4 The source code, including some demonstrative videos and the running example used
in the paper, is available online [22].
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No Shield Shield E Shield T+E
#Cars #Crashes Time Reward Reward Reward
2 703 1133 747 915 603
4 13 1989 1070 685 393
6 0 2000 638 617 375
8 85 1908 477 495 386
10 983 544 170 608 342
Table 1: Results exploitation phase using 10000 simulations. Number of crashes is
given in absolute values over all simulations whereas Reward and Time measures
are given as averages. Time and Crash values are omitted when shielding is
applied as these are > 2000 and 0 respectively. Time denotes the time-units of
simulation prior to a first crash.
is unlikely, that e.g., the leading car accelerates to the maximum speed and then
immediately hits the break until it reaches zero. Such risk tolerance is not allowed
when deploying the shield as even a potential but unlikely future crash should be
shielded against. Execution Phase. We tested all controller combinations for 1000
simulations, and each simulation lasts until a crash or for a maximum of 2000
time units. Table 1 depicts the results. Note, that we learned a global controller
for each number of cars (but use local shields) and that the controllers optimize
a local minimum, therefore the controllers performances differ from each other.
Interestingly, we observe that the combination of unshielded training (Shield E)
provides better results in our setting, compared to a RL agent utilizing the shield
also during training (Shield T+E). But more experiments are needed to discern
this effect in more detail.
7 Conclusion
We presented timed post-shields and timed pre-shields. These are shields for real-
time systems which can be attached either before or after a system, correcting
the outputs received by the environment. In addition, we discussed how timed
shields can be used in reinforcement learning settings. We presented a case study
of a platoon of cars, and demonstrated the potential of a timed post-shield
in RL. In the future, we would like to extend this work into several different
directions. First, we see great potential for shields in RL. In future work, we
want to apply timed shields on several challenging RL settings and investigate
techniques for speeding up the learning performance in addition to providing
safety. Furthermore, we want to exploit techniques from model repair and model
refinement to deal with dynamic environments, and adapt the shields during
runtime if needed. In this work, we treat the system as adversary. In future
work, we plan to study ways to model the spectrum between cooperative and
adversarial systems to be shielded.
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Appendix A Reinforcement Learning Configuration
Our hyper-parameters for the DQN were chosen in the following way. The input
features consists of the distances between the cars and the velocities of the cars.
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Therefore, for n follower cars in the platoon, the input layer has the size 2∗n+1.
We have DNNs for actor and critic, containing 3 hidden layers with Rectified
Linear Units and a linear layer for the output. Networks were optimized with an
Adamax optimizer. We used 16 units in the hidden layers. We used the learning
rate α = 0.002 and the exponential decay rates β1 = 0.9 and β2 = 0.9999. The
output layer is 3n, since the RL agent can pick one of three different possible
accelerations for each follower car. The reward function is designed such that the
total spacing between the vehicle is minimized. If the distance between any two
cars is either ≤ 5m or ≥ 200m, then the reward is set to −1. In all other cases,
the distances between the cars are used within a logarithmic scale to determine
the reward 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 per step.
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